I am surprised to see the Nawab's troops standing in a straight line. One of the main reasons for their defeat in every battle was their lack of discipline. But this painting is after the Battle of Plassey when the British were the real masters, controlling the Nawabs by remote control from Calcutta.

Asad, Where else were these men going to stand? In a geometric garden, and one with extremely carefully tended lawns, were they going to mill around on the Nawabs garden? However by this time this painting was done Indian troops had been mimicking European methods for 20 or 30 years. Many renegade Europeans were making a living in these courts training local armies. I think that you say "defeat in every battle was their lack of discipline" you overlook one major factor. The Indian way of warfare was very different to that of European's, especially before European's arrived. Warfare is an extension of politics, and was generally used as a way of achieving regime change. You should see most wars between Indian States, or civil wars in the light of a power struggle for the leaders role, and its powers of patronage. There were no prizes for losing. If you were on the wrong side at the end of a battle you were going to lose everything. Home, tenancy. patronage, life, etc. etc. Better to chance sides at the last moment, or to get a head start in any flight, than stay and die. The European's were much more used to fighting wars for limited objectives. To win a city or a province here. Defend one there. They also had Rules of War, that attempted to limit collateral damage. These rules did not apply in India, and in the event of being defeated they would not normally have survived. European's in India had to win, if they were going to survive. I believe also that most Indian's turning up at battles were not career soldiers, but were retainers much like earlier feudal retainers in Europe. They were often not particularly keen on their current ruler, who had often been imposed on them. These same rulers had often taxed them remorselessly, and were often fairly unpleasant in the ways they went about it. The retainers didn't particularly want to die, let alone get wounded. They would watch how the battle panned out, and if the enemy looked to be winning, they would get away as fast as possible. If it was their sides day, they would suddenly become far more motivated by the opportunity for plunder. Many of these intra Indian battles should be seen as being more like political demonstrations than out and out battles. Some of my forebears were in Cuddalore which was raided, or passed by warring Indian's on many occasions between 1711 and 1760, and another who was on the receiving end of Mahratta raids in 1757 at Injaram. In trying to understand these events, I have gone through hundreds and hundreds of letters and reports from the time, and a very different picture of Indian warfare comes out. Large battles were in fact very rare. Most war was fought as large scale plundering raids deep into the opponents territory. Indeed the strategic reach of the Mahrattas is staggering. These raiders make even renown horsemen like the Boer Commandos look like amateurs in terms of the range of their raids. They would rarely take on defended locations, and if they did, it was only when they had overwhelming force, and the Pettah or Killa was already weakened. Conversely, the European's for the first 150 years could only hope to win from behind the walls of a fort, or in very short range sorties from the coast. Even fighting campaigns over distances acheived today in a two hour car ride from Mumbai were too far for our logistics. We could only fight in Coalition with local warriors like the Nairs. These early battles were fought by two opponents who were used fighting very different kinds of wars. It was a bit like putting a boxer into the ring with a Karate expert. It took a while for each to realise that they had to change their tactics if they were to actually engage each other with any hope of success. Nick Balmer

Thank you, Nick, for this excellent analysis of the weakness or inadequacy of the Indian mode of warfare which invariably resulted in their defeat in all battles against the Europeans. Even in the decisive Battle of Plassey (Nawab Sirajuddaulah vs. the East India Company), it was the small group of French gunners who fought until the bitter end after the Indian troops had deserted their Nawab. However, before Plassey, the European 'mercenaries' were only manning the artillery and had no influence over the conduct of the war. After the Battle of Plassey, they learned discipline - like marching in straight lines - from the British. The outcome of some of the most important battles in India was decided merely by the the continued 'visibilty' of the King on the royal elephant in the battlefield. Prince Dara Shikoh lost the Battle of Samugarh (which he was winning) against Aurangzeb by being 'advised' by a treacherous General (Khalilullah Khan) to transfer from the howdah of the royal elephant to horseback in the heat of the battle. Similarly, Prince Shah Shuja lost the Battle of Khajuah against Aurangzeb by being 'advised' by yet another traitor (Allavardi Khan) to step down from the elephant to a horse and chase the loser. Since the troops could no longer see their Master on the elephant, they lost heart, and abandoned the field or switched sides in both cases for the reasons you have elaborated. (Apparently, Porus also lost the battle against Alexander for similar reasons but I have to check that.) Prince Shah Shuja rewarded the traitor General Allavardi Khan appropriately. After losing the battle, he called the General to his tent and, without uttering a single word, pierced his heart with a lance. Instant justice?